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The Right to Effective Counsel in Criminal Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Constitution of the United States as well as the laws of
many states, a defendant in a criminal action is entitled not merely
to the formality of representation by any counsel but also to some
degree of efficacy in this representation. Determining whether this
right to effective counsel has been violated is a difficult problem.
One source of difficulty is the potential conflict between two strong
public policy considerations: the desire to spare a defendant the
injustices which can result from ineffective representation as opposed
to the need for finality of judgments and the orderly functioning
of the judicial system. The danger to the orderly administration of
justice created by overturning convictions for failures of counsel is
greater than the corresponding dangers inherent in reversing con-
victions on most other grounds. There, the party's lawyer ordinarily
must object at the trial to the alleged error if it is to be available as
a ground on appeal. This gives the trial court an opportunity to
correct its own error. If the trial judge fails to do so, the objection
is preserved for appeal. In cases involving a denial of effective coun-
sel, however, the situation will often escape the attention of the trial
court, and there will normally be no specific objections on which
the reviewing court can focus its attention.
Cases in this area also tend to involve unusually difficult problems
of proof, particularly in cases where, in the course of a trial, an
attorney has employed tactics which seem reasonable at the
time but which to hindsight seem incompetent. These two sets
of policy considerations-the need for the orderly administration of
justice and the difficulties of proof which are implicit in many
types of cases in this area-are the major factors which may properly
lead courts to hesitate in dealing with cases of allegedly ineffective
representation.
It is important that these valid considerations be distinguished
from the natural prejudice of the legal mind against granting relief to
remedy the errors of a party's own attorney. Since the normal
functioning of an adversary system depends on the principle that a
party is bound by the actions of his attorney, those who are closely
involved in such a system will often be strongly inclined against per-
mitting exceptions to this rule. An important consideration in light
of the particular situations discussed below is whether a refusal to
grant relief is based on a real consideration of public policy, or on
the natural bias against allowing a party to escape the consequences
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of his lawyer's actions and against granting an unfamiliar form of
relief.
The courts have rarely attempted to reduce the decisions in this
field to meaningful categories.' This failure can be attributed partly
to the fact that a denial of effective counsel can take many forms
and partly to the relative infrequency of cases which deal with
this right. Few jurisdictions have had a sufficient number and variety
of cases to allow either the creation of a general standard or the
useful classification of cases. Moreover, the fact that each state
confronted with this problem is generally dealing with the right to
counsel provision in its own constitution discourages the courts from
referring to cases and rules which have arisen in other jurisdictions.
For purposes of this discussion, the many types of denials of
effective counsel will be grouped into three main categories. The
first of these categories is the failure of counsel caused by external
circumstances. This includes cases in which the inefficacy is attributed
to some cause other than the attorney himself, such as orders of the
trial court or the denial of access to the client. The second category
deals with cases which involve failures of counsel caused by the
status or the incompetence of the attorney. This category includes
factors arising from conflicts of interest, lack of training, and other
inadequacies of counsel which can be considered separately from
the performance of the attorney in the course of the trial itself. The
third categoly concerns errors of counsel committed during the
trial of the particular case.
II. THE. MocKERY OF JUSTICE RULE
Although an absolute right to counsel in federal courts has long
been granted defendants in capital cases,2 it was not until 1938 in
Johnson v. Zerbst3 that the right to counsel provision of the sixth
amendment was held to grant more than the light to be repre-
sented by an attorney of one's own choosing. There the court ruled
1. Professor Beaney in his work in the field uses six classifications: Dissatisfaction
with Appointed Counsel, Limitations on the Services of Counsel, Conflicts of Interest,
Inadequate Preparation of Counsel, Ineffective Counsel, and Absence of Counsel during
the Proceedings. BF_ _mrT, ThE Ricrr TO CouNsEL IN AmmcAN CourTs (1955).
2. 1 Stat. 118 (1790).
3. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). "Right," in Holfeldian terms, is defined as an affirmative
claim against another. "Another use of the term 'right,' possibly less usual but by no
means unknown, is to denote that one person is not subject to the power of another
person to alter the legal relations of the person said to have the 'right.' . . . In such
cases the real concept is one of exemption from legal power, i.e., 'immunity."' HoHFELD,
FuNDAE NTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 8 (1923). Thus, the author would suggest that the




that the sixth amendment extends to the defendant an absolute
right to counsel in federal criminal cases. This right was made
applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment in Powell v.
Alabama4 and Gideon v. Wainright.5
The expansion of the right to counsel from a right to have an
attorney appear in court, to the more general right of providing him
with counsel, has been accompanied by a recognition that this right
is not satisfied by mere formality and requires more than token
representation. Thus, in Von Moltke v. Gillies,6 it was held that
although the trial court had actually appointed counsel for the
defendant, there was still a violation of the defendant's right to
counsel since the attorney's appearance was so brief as to be a
mere formality. It was determined that the trial judge paid only
"token obedience to his constitutionally recognized duty to appoint
counsel for petitioner."
Even before the right to counsel in the federal courts was fully
developed, some states recognized that under their own laws a
defendant who was unable to employ counsel had a right to have
counsel provided for him.7 In these states, it seems to have been
consistently recognized that the right demands more than token
representation.8 Thus, it appears that, whenever the law grants a
defendant the right to be represented by counsel in spite of his
inability to employ his own attorney, some minimum standard of
competence and efficacy must be assumed to exist. This minimum
standard may be called the "mockery of justice rule." This constitutes
the lowest common denominator in determining the adequacy of
representation.
This rule had its origin in mob trial cases such as Moore v.
Dempsey9 where five negro defendants charged with the murder of
a white man had been tried in an atmosphere so charged with mob
violence that both the jury and the defense attorney appear to
have been intimidated to such an extent that the trial became a
hollow formality. The attorney had not even followed the obvious
course of asking for a change of venue, and it was alleged that, had
the defendant been acquitted, no juror could have continued to live
in the community. Although this case did not turn entirely on the
lack of effective counsel, it has led to the rule that, whenever the
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1964).
6. 332 U.S. 708 (1947).
7. See, e.g., In re Jingles, 27 Cal. 2d 500, 165 P.2d 12 (1946); Jones v. State, 48 Ga.
224, 172 S.E. 471 (1933); Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920);
People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356 (1941).
8. Ibid.
9. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
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failure of a defendant's counsel is so gross as to render the entire
trial a sham or a mockery of justice, the conviction is invalid. This
rule has been stated in various ways by different courts. Some say
that the representation must have been "so ineffective as to amount
to no counsel at all" 10 or to "virtually no representation,"" but,
however stated, this test requires a total failure of counsel so grave
that it amounts to a breakdown of the judicial process.
Another illustration of the extreme circumstances necessary to bring
about a reversal under the mockery of justice rule can be found in
Jones v. Huff.12 There it was alleged that the defendant's lawyer
had failed to object to the introduction of a confession obtained by
use of the "th-d degree," that he failed to call witnesses who would
have established the defendant's innocence, and that he refused to
comply with a juror's request for a sample of the defendant's hand-
writing. The court concluded that "these were not mere mistakes
of counsel or errors in the course of trial. If true they constituted
a total failure to present the case of the accused in any fundamental
respect."13 This case demonstrates the gross errors necessary to meet
the test set out by the "mockery of justice" rule, and it appears
that no single act of incompetence, however inexcusable and
damaging, can satisfy this test. The cumulative effect of an attorney's
errors must be sufficient to render the proceedings a sham. In one
sense, the mockery of justice rule is not a standard for determining
efficacy or competence, but is rather a criterion for determining
whether a defendant has, in any meaningful sense, been represented
by counsel at all. The following sections will discuss the applica-
bility of other rules for deciding whether a defendant has been
deprived of his right to effective counsel in those cases in which
courts have gone beyond the bare minimum of the mockery of justice
rule.
III. FAmuREs CAUSED BY ExTEnNAL CIRCUMSTANCES
A case in which the courts have generally been liberal in granting
relief involves a failure of counsel caused by some factor beyond
the control of the attorney or his client. The most obvious example
of such a situation is the case in which an order of the trial court
prevents the attorney from fully representing his client. Thus,
convictions have been reversed where a court has ordered the
attorney to cease representing the defendant in or out of cortt,14
10. State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 297, 72 N.W.2d 438 (1955).
11. United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948).
12. 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
13. Id. at 15.
14. Meeks v. United States, 163 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1947).
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and where the trial judge has pronounced a defendant guilty before
hearing the defense attorney's final argument. 15
Instances of such direct interference with counsel are rare, how-
ever, and the problem of failure of counsel caused by action of the
trial court arises more often through the court's failure to allow time
for the attorney to prepare his case. Some cases involving lack of
time for preparation are so extreme that reversal was clearly indicated.
For example, a lawyer in the courtroom had been appointed just as
the case was being brought to trial and allowed only a few minutes
for preparation and consultation with his client.16 Such extreme
facts are not the only basis for reversal. Depending on the circum-
stances of the case, periods of seven days17 or more may be deemed
so inadequate as to require reversal. With proper circumstances,
the period could be a good deal longer, since, as some cases suggest,
the attorney should be offered the opportunity for a thorough investi-
gation of the facts and preparation of his case for trial.18
Another way in which the action of the trial court can amount to a
denial of defendant's right to effective counsel is by preventing the
attorney from conferring with his client. Here too, reviewing courts
have been active in upholding the rights of the defendant. Thus, one
case was reversed after the trial judge warned the defendant not
to discuss the case with his lawyer.19 More difficult cases deal with the
point in the proceedings in which a consultation may be held. In
People v. Lathram,20 the court held that the right to counsel includes
the right of the defendant to confer with his attorney whenever he
deems it necesary in order that the defendant may assist in conducting
his defense and in giving information to his attorney. Refusal to
allow this consultation has been held to be a denial of effective
representation.
Actions of the trial court, of course, are not the only external circum-
stances which may result in a failure of effective counsel. The privacy
of the consultation between the attorney and his client, for example,
may be violated. Thus, cases in which authorities have tapped tele-
15. Floyd v. State, 90 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1956).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Helwig, 159 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1947) (one minute to
prepare). See also Hawks v. Olsen, 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
17. 297 N.Y. 81, 74 N.E.2d 657 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 204 Ga. 384, 50 S.E.2d 10 (1948). See also State
v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294 (1949), which is interesting in that it held
that a denial of effective counsel resulted from the court's failure to allow time for
the attorney to prepare his case on a collateral issue-the constitutionality of the method
of choosing prospective jurors for the case.
19. United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950).
20. 192 Cal. App. 2d 216, 13 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1961).
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phone consultations2' or used an eavesdropping device 2 have re-
sulted in overturned convictions.
The normal judicial generosity in the area of failures of counsel
caused by external circumstances is further demonstrated by the
general rule that in cases of this type a defendant need not prove
that specific prejudice resulted from the situation. Such a showing
was held unnecessary in People v. Lathram and in Shapiro v. United
States.24 The latter, an unusual case, involved a military attorney
who was tried and convicted for misconduct in his defense of a
court-martialed soldier. Counsel for the defendant had been given
insufficient time to prepare a case and the conviction was held to be
void in spite of the fact that the defendant, a lawyer himself, might
have defended himself adequately.
Leniency of reviewing courts in this area is justified where the
actions of the trial court or of some party other than the defense
attorney himself causes the denial of counsel. In these cases, the
fact that there is no method of calling complaints to the attention of
the trial court and of preserving them for appeal is of little im-
portance since counsel may object during the trial. Furthermore,
the difficulty of determining whether a violation of the right to counsel
has occurred is not great in most of these cases, since the issue will
generally turn on a single action which appears plainly in the record.
Thus, the appellate courts are freed of the burden, common in similar
cases, of making a difficult judgment based on the record as a whole,
rather than on specific issues appearing therein. Instead, they can
fashion a reasonably objective standard in dealing with the problem
of whether acts of third parties result in a violation of a defendant's
right to effective counsel.
IV. FAmuRs CAUSED BY STATUS OR INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL
The second class of failures of effective counsel-those caused by
the general status or incompetence of the attorney as distinct from
specific acts or omissions of an attorney during the trial-may be
subdivided into two groups. The first includes cases in which the
circumstances cast doubt upon the attorney's loyalty, good faith, or
zeal in regard to the defendant's cause, while the second group deals
with cases of incompetence.
The usual case involving a lack of loyalty on the part of the
21. Coplan v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
22. State v. Cory, 62 Wash. 2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963), 17 VAN. L. REv.
568 (1964).
23. Supra note 20.
24. 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. C1. 1947).
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attorney concerns a conflict of interest, often in the representation
of co-defendants. In an obvious case of a conflict of interest, habeas
corpus was granted a petitioner who had been tried with three co-
defendants, all represented by the same attorney. Each of the other
defendants had defended himself by accusing petitioner of the crime.
In spite of the conscientious efforts of the attorney, it had been
impossible for one lawyer to represent all the defendants fairly.2
Other circumstances can create an unconscionable conflict of interest.
Thus, where counsel has also been an attorney for one of the witnesses,
and this relationship has prevented him from engaging in a thorough
cross-examination, the conviction should be reversed.26 The problem
can also arise when defendant's attorney holds some public office.
In Berry v. Gray,27 habeas corpus was granted a prisoner whose lawyer
had been a county attorney bound by statute to assist the state.
In dealing with cases involving conflicts of interest, courts have
generally held that, although there must be a real conflict and not
merely a joint representation of co-defendants, a showing that actual
prejudice resulted from the conflict will not be required. Thus, in
Craig v. United States,9 where a conflict of interest had prevented
the cross-examination of two witnesses, the court admitted that the
results of such a cross-examination were speculative, but found that
the representation "was not as effective as it might have been," and
this alone was held sufficient for reversal. In these cases, such liber-
ality seems warranted, since the problem of proving a conflict generally
turns only on proof of the fact that the attorney was counsel for
another party whose interests at the trial were adverse to those of the
defendant, a matter which is generally susceptible of clear proof.
When the alleged indifference or lack of loyalty of an attorney
appears in some form other than a conflict of interest, however, the
problems of proof can be most difficult. Thus, while frequently
stating that a defendant is entitled to the devoted services of counsel,3"
the courts have required convincing proof of disloyalty or indifference.
In McDonald v. Hudspath,31 the court refused to grant habeas corpus
25. Wright v. Johnson, 77 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Calif. 1948). See also People v.
Lanigan, 140 Pac. 224 (Calif. 1943).
26. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States, 235 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1956).
27. 155 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
28. Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
974 (1956); Farris v. Hunter, 144 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1944).
29. 217 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1954). See also Glassner v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1941). In People v. Bopp, 279 Ill. 184, 116 N.E. 679 (1917), the court
reversed a conviction where one attorney represented two defendants who had entirely
separate alibis holding that it was sufficient that a conflict might have arisen between
the two defenses.
30. Jackson v. State, 316 P.2d 213 (Okla. 1957).
31. 113 F.2d 984 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 683 (1940). McDonald later
was successful in an action brought in the Ninth Circuit alleging the same facts.
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even though the attorney-client relationship had disintegrated to such
an extent that, at the time of the trial, the defendant was the com-
plainant in a suit to disbar his attorney, and the attorney had stated
his willingness to be discharged. In those rare cases where disloyalty
of the attorney is shown it seems clear that the courts will grant
relief. In State v. Jones, 2 the lawyer had objected to being appointed
defense attorney in a murder trial on the ground that he had been a
friend of the victim and was so prejudiced against the accused that he
was unable to represent him properly. The trial judge ordered him to
take the case in spite of this protest, but the conviction was reversed
on appeal.
Another circumstance that may prove strong enough to cause the
reversal of a conviction based on lack of loyalty is evidence that
counsel was intimidated by a threat of violence or by community
pressure. Thus, in Downer v. Dunaway,a3 where there had been a
mob attack on the jail, where counsel had been appointed only one
hour before the trial, and where the trial itself lasted one day, the
court relied on Moore v. Dempsey4 in holding that there had been
no adequate representation. Future litigation in this area may arise
in cases where lawyers representing Negro defendants bow to com-
munity custom or pressure and fail to challenge the composition of
a jury which has been selected by racially discriminatory means. In
such a case there would be sufficient grounds for holding that a lawyer
had failed to give his client unwavering loyalty.1
In cases involving incompetence of counsel, the same contrast exists
between allegations relying on specific facts which can be easily
proved or disproved and general allegations of incompetence or
stupidity. Cases which are susceptible of clear proof arise in the rare
instances in which a defendant has been represented by a person who
has not been admitted to the bar. In Jones v. State,36 the court re-
versed the conviction of a defendant who had been represented by two
law students, whom the trial court had inadvertantly appointed. The
court held that, where the supposed counsel had not been admitted
to the bar, there was a complete denial of the right to counsel and it
was not necessary to examine the record of the trial to see whether
prejudice had actually occurred. The same result was reached in
32. State v. Jones, 174 La. 1074, 142 So. 693 (1932).
33. 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931).
34. Supra note 9.
35. See Cobb v. Balham, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1954), where the court voided
a conviction because of racial discrimination in the selection of jurors and expressly
pretermitted the question whether the failure of counsel to challenge the jury panel
violated defendant's right to effective representation.
36. 57 Ga. 603, 195 S.E. 316 (1938).
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People v. Cox3 7 where the defendant had hired a man who falsely
represented himself to be a lawyer. It is doubtful, however, that a
mere failure of an out-of-state attorney to obtain leave to try a
particular case in the jurisdiction will cause a court to hold that a
denial of effective counsel has occurred.1 A problem also arises in
the case of a defendant who has been jointly represented by a layman
and a qualified lawyer. In Higgins v. Parker,39 such representation
was held to be adequate, but the court relied on the fact that
throughout the trial the licensed attorney had taken an active part
in the defense. Had he been only an attorney of record, the court
might well have reached the opposite result. Thus, in People v. Cox,4
defendant's unlicensed counsel was assisted by a regularly qualified
attorney, but, since the qualified attorney did no more than question
some of the veniremen, his presence failed to cure the defective
representation.
In cases where a defendant has been represented by a licensed
attorney, it is highly difficult to secure the reversal of a conviction
on the grounds of the attorney's ignorance or incompetence. Some
defendants have alleged that they were denied effective counsel
because of their lawyer's inexperience. But inexperience alone does
not usually justify a holding of failure of counsel.4 ' Where sheer
ignorance or incompetence of counsel is alleged, most courts have
held that a defendant will be deemed to have been deprived of his
right to counsel only when the attorney's incompetence has rendered
the trial a mockery of justice.42 In light of the serious problems of
proof in establishing the incompetence of the lawyer, the rule is
probably sound, but in some cases it has led to extreme results, since
it appears that no degree of incompetence will suffice so long as there
is a genuine contest in the trial court. Thus, in Hagan v. United
States 3 an allegation that the defendant's attorney had been suffer-
ing from a severe mental illness was deemed legally insufficient, since
the record showed that there had been a spirited trial. In dealing with
most of the cases in this category, however, the courts have generally
been wise in differentiating between the cases which seldom present
37. 12 Ill. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
38. See, e.g., State v. Derby, 143 Kan. 590, 56 P.2d 57 (1936).
39. 354 Mo. 888, 191 S.W.2d 668, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 801 (1945). See also
State v. Johnson, 64 S.D. 162, 265 N.W. 599 (1936), where the defendant was repre-
sented by a disbarred attorney and a regularly licensed attorney.
40. Supra note 36.
41. United States v. Helwig, supra note 16 (attorney had been at the bar one
year); People v. Winchester, 352 Ill. 237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933).
42. Wilcoxon v. Aldridge, 102 Ga. 634, 153 S.E.2d 873, (1941). Se also Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
43. 9 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1925).
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difficult problems of proof and those that frequently present virtually
insoluble ones. The cases in which the alleged failure of effective
counsel rests on a single allegation susceptible of clear proof, such as
those involving conflicts of interest and representation by a layman,
there has been liberal treatment. But the courts remain cautious in
dealing with those cases which involve allegations of general incom-
petence or disloyalty.
V. FA1IURs CAUSED BY EiRoRs iN THE COURSE OF THE TYAL
The category which raises the most difficult problems involves
specific errors of counsel in the course of the trial. Most courts accept
the rule stated in Diggs v. Welch,44 where the appellate court held
that once the trial court had discharged its duty by appointing a com-
petent attorney the defendant's right to counsel had been satisfied
and subsequent errors of counsel would be ignored unless they
rendered the trial a mockery of justice. Certain courts, however, have
found particular errors of counsel sufficiently grave to warrant over-
turning convictions.
A distinction may be drawn between rights of the defendant which
are procedural and do not tend to affect the outcome of the trial-
such as the right to quash an indictment for curable defects-and more
substantial rights. Courts have been reluctant to grant relief in cases
where a purely procedural right has been sacrificed by the attorney.
In McConnaughy v. Alvis,'45 a conviction was upheld although the
attorney had failed to move to quash the indictment for a clear error
on its face and had failed to contest the venue even though there
was considerable doubt as to which county had been the site of the
crime. Similarily, in People -v. Keagle,46 counsers refusal to accept
the trial court's offer of a mistrial was held not to have resulted in a
failure of effective counsel. A more difficult situation arises when an
attorney fails to appeal or commits procedural errors which prevent
an appeal. In People v. Boreman,47 a failure to obtain a bill of excep-
tions and file an appeal within the time granted by the trial court did
not amount to ineffective representation. In People v. Buck,4" how-
ever, it was suggested that where a sentence of death has been
imposed it may be the duty of counsel to appeal.
A denial of effective counsel may also result where the attorney has
unwisely recommended a plea of guilty. In cases where the decision
44. Supra note 42.
45. 100 Ohio App. 245, 136 N.E.2d 127 (1955).
46. 7 IM. 2d 408, cert. denied, 351 U.S. 942 (1955).
47. 401 Ill. 566, 82 N.E.2d 459, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 927 (1948).
48. 6 App. Div. 2d 528, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1958).
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was reasonable when made, the fact that in retrospect it appears to
have been unfortunate will not suffice to vitiate the conviction.
49
But where the recommendation that defendant plead guilty has been
negligently or ignorantly made, there are good reasons for upsetting
the conviction since obviously this error alone completely destroys
the defendant's case and may do more harm than any number of
minor errors committed in the course of trying the case under a not
guilty plea. In People v. Abraham,50 where defendant's attorney had
simply advised him to plead guilty if he had committed the crime, the
court reversed the conviction.
Perhaps the most difficult cases in this area involve alleged errors
of counsel in failing to raise a defense or to present evidence since
such allegations concern decisions which can wholly destroy a de.
fendant's case but which rest so heavily on the tactical judgment of
the attorney that it is most difficult to determine whether any error
has been committed. This problem can often arise from an attorney's
failure to plead a defense of insanity. In United States v. Plummer, '
it was held that defendant's right to effective counsel was not violated
when his lawyer, who had thoroughly considered the possibility of
pleading insanity, reasonably decided not to raise the defense. But
in a more difficult case it was held that, where counsel failed to plead
that a defendant was insane at the time of trial and where defendant
had been properly adjudged insane shortly before and after the trial,
there was a denial of due process and a defect of counsel sufficient to
render the trial a mockery of justice.52 In other cases, courts have been
reluctant to overturn a conviction for counsel's failure to raise a de-
fense unless it is sufficiently harmful to invoke the mockery of justice
rule.5
3
A similar problem arises in cases dealing with an attorney's failure
to attack the prosecution's case either by cross-examination or by
objection to inadmissible evidence. The same problems of proving
dereliction by the attorney apply as it is generally impossible to
determine whether the attorney was unaware of the situation or was
simply exercising his judgment as to proper tactics. This is especially
true in cases of failure to object to questions or evidence, since fre-
quent objections may prejudice a jury against the defendant's case.
49. See, e.g., People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 358 P.2d 295 (1960), where the
decision to plead guilty was made as part of a definite and reasonable trial plan
designed to portray the defendant as merely an erring youth. The failure of the plan
did not reflect on the competence of the attorney who devised it. See also Shepherd v.
Hunter, 163 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1957).
50. 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
51. 171 F. Supp. I (D.C. Cir. 1959).
52. People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
53. See Wilson v. State, 268 Ala. 86, 105 So. 2d 66 (1958).
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In Harris v. United States, 54 the court held that failure of counsel to
object to leading questions did not have the effect of violating the
defendant's right to effective counsel. In Slaughter v. United States,55
failure to cross-examine the prosecuting witness or to bring out the
fact that the witness had a criminal record was also held to be a
matter of trial tactics. The case of Edwards v. United States56
stated that only the mockery of justice rule would apply to allegations
of errors regarding strategy, tactics, mistake, and inexperience of
counsel, and that a defendant is bound by his attorney's decisions as,
to strategy.
Despite the general soundness of this rule, it is easy to imagine
situations in which particular errors in the course of the trial are too
grave to be mistaken for tactical decisions of the attorney. In People
v. Ibarra,7 a bold decision by the Supreme Court of California, a
conviction for the possession of narcotics was reversed when it ap-
peared that the defense attorney had failed to object to the admission
of the heroin which had been obtained by an illegal search because
he was under the false impression that by objecting to the search he
would waive his primary defense (that his client had never been in
possession of the heroin). Although the court stated that it was
relying on the mockery of justice rule and held that the attorney's
ignorance of a basic rule of law reduced the trial to a sham, it is
clear that a single error as to a rule of law in one alternative defense
can rarely serve to meet the stringent requirements of the mockery of
justice rule. Another departure from the rule was made in the bizarre
case of State v. Karston.58 There two defendants had pleaded guilty
to a charge of first degree murder and under state law the only
alternatives were death and life imprisonment. In his closing argu-
ment, counsel for the two defendants said that although he realized
that both were guilty of murder in the first degree he felt that the
circumstances called for differences in the punishment of the two
defendants-with the inevitable inference that he felt that one of his
clients should be hanged. The conviction was reversed on account
of this error, although the decision can be partly explained on the
ground of a conflict of interest. In effect, these two cases show the
difficulty of going beyond the mockery of justice rule in the area of
specific errors at trial since both rely on a peculiar factual situation. In
Ibarra, the court was able to determine positively that counsel's deci-
sion not to challenge the evidence was not based on a valid tactical
54. 239 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1957).
55. 89 A.2d 646 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1952).
56. 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
57. People v. Ibarra, 34 Cal. Reptr. 863, 386 P.2d 847 (1963).
58. 247 Iowa 32, 72 NW.2d 463 (1955).
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consideration because of a statement which the attorney made to the
trial court revealing his ignorance of the law in regard to alternative
defenses, while in Karston the factual situation was unique. The
strict attitude of the courts in dealing with errors of this sort is
justified by the difficulties of proof and the consideration of finality
of. judgments. It is also justified by the fact that in this particular
area more cases involving the right to counsel will arise, since individ-
ual errors by normally competent attorneys will be much more com-
mon than in cases of total incompetence or disloyalty.
VI. COUNSEL OF CHOicE AND APPOImN D COUNSrL
A major issue which affects most aspects of the right to effective
counsel is whether, in deciding if a defendant has been denied this
right, the courts will distinguish between privately employed counsel
and counsel appointed by the court. Such a distinction clearly would
not apply to those cases where the failure of counsel has been caused
by external circumstances, but in all other cases there is a split of
authority on the question. At first glance, there seem to be strong
reasons for holding that the court will scrutinize the actions of
appointed counsel more closely than those of counsel chosen by
the defendant himself. The foremost consideration is the glaring
inequity of arbitrarily selecting an attorney for the defendant and then
holding the defendant responsible for that attorney's errors. It seems
far less shocking to allow a defendant to suffer for the errors of an
attorney whom he has personally selected. It may well be asked
how much of this apparent difference can be attributed to an
actual difference in the degree of injustice in the two cases and how
much results from the inevitable bias of a legal mind accustomed to
dealing with an adversary system such as ours, which depends for
its daily functioning on the principle that a client must be bound by
the actions of his attorney. It is true, however, that a defendant
selecting his own attorney normally has some opportunity to discover
the qualifications of his attorney. Another reason why errors made
by an attorney of defendant's own choosing should not be considered
on appeal is that, since a defendant has the power to waive his right
to counsel altogether, he can be deemed to have waived the right
to effective counsel to the extent of any errors made by an attorney
whom he freely selects. These considerations have led many courts
to hold that they will more readily hold that a defendant has been
denied the right to effective representation in cases where his attorney
has been appointed by the court than in cases in which he has been
represented by an attorney whom he has chosen. Some have held
that in cases where the defendant has been represented by counsel
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of his own choice, a conviction will not be overturned on the
grounds of failure of counsel unless the counsel's performance is so
defective as to render the trial a sham or a mockery of justice. Thus,
in People v. Robillard,9 the court said that,
the handling of the trial by counsel of accused's own choice will not be
declared inadequate except in those rare cases where his counsel displays
such a lack of diligence and competence as to reduce the trial to a farce or
a sham.
The Illinois court has stated, however, that "poor representation by
an attorney of defendant's own choosing is of no legal moment."6°
Even under this rule, however, a conviction may be reversed where
the errors of counsel are unusually shocking. In one such case, the
Illinois court reversed the conviction of an uneducated defendant
whose trial counsel had displayed such remarkable incompetence
that the court observed that he "seemed to be unfamiliar with the
simplest rules of evidence and incapable of comprehending the rules
when suggested to him by the trial court"61 and concluded that the
defendant would have fared much better with no counsel at all. It
seems, therefore, that no court will go so far as to hold that errors of
counsel of choice can never be grounds for reversal. But it is also
clear that in many jurisdictions it will be extremely difficult to have
a conviction overruled for failure of effective counsel in any case
where defendant has been represented by counsel of his own choice.62
This rule leads to the paradoxical result that a defendant whose
attorney is appointed by the court is entitled to a higher standard of
performance than a defendant who selects and hires his own attorney.
It can be argued that there is less danger of indifference or disloyalty
on the part of a privately employed lawyer, and in any event no
court has suggested that the counsel of choice should be held to a
higher standard of competence.
The better rule, it is believed, is stated in Craig v. United States,
63
which held that it is immaterial whether counsel is chosen or ap-
pointed. Although it may be true that there is less danger of indif-
ference or lethargy on the part of privately retained attorneys, no
good reason appears for denying a defendant redress when palpable
errors do occur simply because he chose to employ, his own attorney.
The argument that since a defendant can waive his right to counsel
altogether he may fairly be deemed to have waived it to the extent
59. Supra note 49.
60.. People v. Ventire, 415 Ill. 587, 114 N.E.2d 710 (1953).
61. People v. Avitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924).
62. See-Burton v. United States, 151 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
63. 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954).
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of errors made by an attorney he has selected, overlooks the fact
that waiver of a right must be made intelligently and deliberately.
Moreover, while the thesis that defendant who accepts appointed
counsel relys heavily upon the trial court is undoubtedly correct, it
is also true that an individual who employs his own attorney may
be relying on the courts which, by licensing an attorney, hold him out
as a qualified member of the bar.
VII. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
Vhen a defendant seeks redress for the denial of his right to
effective counsel, there is seldom any difficulty with the forms of
action available, since relief can normally be sought either through
appeal or through habeas corpus. Relief may also be granted by the
trial court itself through a motion for a new trial or a writ of error
coram nobis." It is possible, however, that a defendant will find that
one of these routes is blocked. Obviously, the problem commonly
arises when the period allowed for an appeal has passed and the
defendant is left to seek habeas corpus. Another type of problem
arises when the defendant is prevented from raising the issue of
effective counsel on appeal because the events constituting the denial
of counsel were outside the scope of the trial itself. In Von Moltke
v. Gilliese for example, the defendant had received defective legal
advice from lawyer-agents of the government during imprisonment
and in the trial court had waived her right to counsel and pleaded
guilty in reliance on this advice. Thus, the denial of counsel had not
taken place during the trial and it was said that habeas corpus was the
only available means of attacking the judgment.
Habeas corpus, however, seems to be an adequate remedy. Allega-
tions that effective counsel was lacking raise constitutional questions
which have led many jurisdictions to hold that a denial of the right
to counsel terminates the jurisdiction of the court,66 thereby making
habeas corpus a clearly appropriate remedy.
The major problems that have arisen in seeking redress have con-
cerned the burden of proof which a defendant is required to meet.
In this respect, habeas corpus may be a more doubtful remedy than
appeal, since it appears that courts will require the petitioner to bear
a heavier burden of proof in an action for habeas corpus, and the
proceedings of the trial court will be given a stronger presumption of
64. United States v. Harris, 155 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. Calif. 1957).
65. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
66. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950); In re Motz,
100 Ohio App. 296, 136 N.E.2d 430 (1955); Petition of Potts, 296 P.2d 180 (Okla.
1956).
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regularity.67 There is also some indication that courts look with dis-
favor on petitions for habeas corpus based on denials of effective
counsel. In Jones v. Huff,6 the court observed that "it is well known
that the drafting of petitions for habeas corpus has become a game
in many penal institutions, and the opportunity to try an unsuccessful
former lawyer has undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner."69
In spite of this substantial problem, it should also be noted that, in
many cases of inadequate representation, a defendant will have
little time to learn that his attorney's performance was defective
until after the time for appeal has passed.
Another problem which often arises in cases dealing with the right
to counsel is whether a-defendant has effectively waived his right.
It is normally held that the defendant alone has the burden of proving
that the right was not waived.70 Although the problem of a general
waiver of the right to counsel is not present in cases dealing only
with effective counsel, defects may be waived by a defendant's failure
to object in the trial court if, under the circumstances, he should
have known of them at the time.
71
VIII. APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL STANDARDS TO THE STATES
It is clear that some degree of effective representation is demanded
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Is the
standard of effective counsel under the fourteenth amendment iden-
tical with the standard required by the sixth amendment? In Hawk
v. Olsen,72 the Supreme Court reversed a state court's denial of habeas
corpus to a petitioner whose attorney had lacked adequate time to
consult with the defendant or prepare the case. The court, however,
did not indicate what standard of effective representation it was
applying. The facts were extreme; defense counsel had entered the
case as the jury was being selected and had not had any prior
consultation with the defendant. The Court, therefore, could have
reversed the state court's decision even under the mockery of justice
rule. In a district court decision, it was held that the mockery of
justice rule was indeed the applicable test. The court held that,
"the due process clause of the federal constitution does not require
67. Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 192 P.2d 147 (1948).
68. 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
69. Id. at 16.
70. Moore v. State, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
71. See, e.g., Drolet v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 382, 140 N.E.2d 165 (1957),
where defendant's attorney left the courtroom during the trial and the defendant failed
to object, the trial judge reasonably assumed that the defendant had consented to his
departure.
72. 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
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this Court to reconsider the tactics adopted by counsel in conducting
petitioner's defense in the absence of facts tending to show that the
trial was reduced to a mockery of justice."
73
There are, however, strong indications that the due process clause
incorporates the more liberal rules for determining effective counsel
which are being developed under the sixth amendment. When con-
sidering at what point during the proceedings counsel must be
provided, the states have been held to the strict rule that a defendant
is entitled to the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceed-
ings.74 In dealing with an analogous issue-the right of an accused
to confront the witnesses against him-the Court recently held that
the sixth amendment's guarantee of this right is directly incorporated
in the fourteenth amendment. In Pointer v. Texas,75 the majority
ruled that this right is a "fundamental right essential to a
fair trial," and said that "the right of an accused to be confronted with
the witnesses against him must be determined by the same standards
whether the right is denied in a federal or state proceeding."76 The
majority cited the right to counsel as another sixth amendment right
which is fundamental to a fair trial. Thus, it appears that, at least in
the future, the federal courts will hold the states to the same standards
of effective representation as are applicable to federal prosecutions.
IX. CONCLUSION
The results reached by the courts in dealing with cases of ineffective
counsel form a more coherent pattern than the courts' frequent use
of ad hoc language in these cases would suggest. To some extent, the
three categories of cases set forth above reflect important aspects of
this pattern. Jurisdictions which apply a different standard in dealing
with privately employed and appointed counsel tend to apply their
double standard most often in cases falling within the second category,
dealing with failures related to the status or competence of counsel,
and the third category, which includes cases of errors in the course of
trial. The double standard does not apply to cases in the first category,
where the failure of effective representation is caused by some factor
beyond the control of the attorney.
In the important matter of policy considerations, the difficulties
which lead the courts to deny relief for failures of effective representa-
tion become increasingly severe in the second and third categories.
The problems of proof are no more difficult than those encountered in
73. Application of Atchley, 169 F. Supp. 313, 318 (N.D. Calif. 1958).
74. See Hawk v. Olsen, supra note 72.
75. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
76. Id. at 406.
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other cases so long as the allegations are within the class of denials
caused by external circumstances, but in the second class of cases-
while some types of cases such as conflicts of interest remain suscep-
tible of normal proof-other types raise peculiarly difficult problems.
And, in the cases of errors occurring in the course of trial, problems of
proof are very great in all but the most exceptional cases. The need
for finality is also more apparent in the second and third groups of
cases, since in these cases the trial court has little opportunity to
correct the situation, and the inadequacy of counsel may only appear
as an allegation on appeal or often on a petition for habeas corpus
long after the time for appeal has expired.
Also, the false policy considerations resulting from prejudice against
an unfamiliar remedy are increasingly manifest in the latter categories.
Most cases in the first group can be understood in familiar terms
simply as errors of the trial court or of other officials. The second
group also contains some familiar concepts such as conflicts of interest,
while the third group seems alien to most of our legal traditions. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the courts are inclined to be most
liberal with cases falling under the first heading and to insist in-
creasingly on the single test of the mockery of justice rule in dealing
with the last two groups.
Since cases in this area have generally been decided on an ad hoc
basis, some such division of these cases into meaningful categories is
a necessary requisite to a formulation of the law in this field. If the
courts begin to categorize the separate problems and to recognize
the patterns which have begun to emerge, the law in this area can
become more meaningful and its improvement in specific details will
be possible.
ERmEST C. KELLY, JR.
NOTES 1937
